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Abstract 
 
In this paper we estimate a sectoral real wage equation for three regional blocs of the enlarged EU 
that we defined as North (wealthiest EU), South (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and East (acceding 
Central and Eastern European countries). The estimation results show that real wages react 
differently in each of the blocs to the impact of market size, location and factor endowments across 
a range of industrial sectors which differ by their degrees of economies of scale and skill-intensities 
in the presence of transport costs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Eastern enlargement of the EU will be a reality in less than one year’s time. Ten countries will 
become members of one of the largest economic blocs in the world and two more (Bulgaria and 
Romania) may be admitted by 2007. Thus, except for the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and 
Malta, the new members will be Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).3 The real 
wages in these countries are on average five times lower than in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and 
ten times lower than in the wealthiest EU countries. This begs the question as to what will be the 
impact of the accession on real wages of both the existing and new members of the EU. 
 
Empirical applications of NEG models usually test particular relationships derived from complex 
theoretical models.4  One of those relationships is a wage equation where wages are a function of 
market and supplier access and also of access to a pool of skilled workers. In turn these variables 
are distance-weighted averages of incomes and human capital using distance coefficients taken 
from a gravity model. This relationship has been tested at an aggregated level for NAFTA by 
Hanson (1997, 1998) and in a worldwide context by Redding and Venables (2001) and Venables 
(2001). These studies conclude that nominal wages increase with proximity to markets and 
suppliers. Venables (2001) finds two separate European wage gradients, one from the EU core to 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, and another from Western to Eastern Europe. Using regional data for 
respectively Canada and the UK, Hunt and Mueller (2002) and Monastiriotis (2002) conclude that 
regions with more human capital tend to have higher average wages.  
 
Our paper tests a real wage equation where real wages depend on access to both goods and factor 
markets, in particular to a pool of skilled workers. However, our study differs from the previous ones 
in several ways. First, we think of the EU as composed of three groups: a core of wealthier 
countries (North) and two peripheries, one in the South (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and another 
in the East (new member countries). Second, we conduct a sectoral study of industrial sectors with 
different degrees of scale economies and skill-intensity in the countries of an enlarged EU-25. 
Third, we extend the concept of market and supplier access to include productivity spillovers from 
both markets and suppliers. Finally, we use a panel of transition data with an estimation structure 
(Panel Corrected Standard Errors) that allows for country-specific variances and country-pair-
specific covariances in unbalanced panels. The panel structure provides a larger dataset without 
eliminating the time-series dimension in the data.  
                                                     
3 In the paper we refer to CEECs, or alternatively to EU-East, as being the group formed by Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and, on the assumption that they will effectively join the EU, 
Bulgaria and Romania.   
4 For a thorough survey of empirical work within the NEG framework see Overman et al. (2001). 
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Our main findings can be summarised as follows. Though the overall relationship between either 
size, endowments or productivity in each of the markets and real wages is positive, these react 
more to size, less to endowments and even less to productivity.  
 
These reactions, when significant, also differ among countries and sectors when we jointly regress 
real wages. In the North, as would be anticipated, real wages react positively to the size of the 
home market, size and skill of suppliers and negatively to market access. However, surprisingly 
they also react negatively to the level of their own and their markets endowments, and their own 
productivity and activity rate. It appears in this mature market that competition amongst factors 
reduces the real wage level. 
 
In the South, real wages react positively only to access to markets and suppliers, and react 
negatively to the size of the home market, the productivity of markets, and unemployment. For 
these countries competition in the goods markets seems to be the overriding force in mitigating real 
wage increases. 
 
In the East, real wages react positively to the size of the home market, market access in high scale 
sectors, supplier access, own endowments and productivity, as would be expected. However, they 
also react positively to unemployment and activity rates, which is taken to be a product of the 
transition to a market based economy. They react negatively to market access in low scale sectors, 
endowments and productivity of markets and suppliers, indicating that the impact of competition, 
from albeit higher real wage economies, is of real concern to these economies.  
 
These findings support the approach that is being taken by the EU in offering a mix of policy 
measures encompassing income, education and skills together with infrastructure development as 
each of the regions has a different wage reaction function. 
 
In Section 2 we show how sectoral real wages correlate with access to the goods and labour 
markets across the EU-25 countries. Section 3 presents the empirical wage equation and Section 4 
provides the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data Features 
 
Some of the explanatory variables in our model are weighted averages either of the sample 
countries’ GDPs, human capital endowments or productivity. These variables were constructed 
using as weights distances and distance coefficients taken from a gravity model. This formulation 
goes back to Harris (1954), who defined the distance-weighted average of incomes as a market 
potential function, this is, the potential demand for goods produced in a certain location is the sum 
of the purchasing power in all other locations weighted by transport costs (and these are a function 
of distance). Redding and Venables (2001) and Venables (2001) propose the use of two concepts, 
market access and supplier access, that use distance coefficients taken out of respectively export 
and import gravity equations. Accordingly, countries have access to a market where to place their 
goods while exporters and a market where to draw inputs from while importers. We have added a 
further element to account for the level of productivity of firms in each market, once again weighted 
by the distance coefficients. If firms in an export market have a high level of productivity they will be 
able to compete more effectively, whilst suppliers from these countries will offer more competitively 
priced inputs. 
 
We recognise this formulation as a convenient way of testing empirically the presence of backward 
and forward linkages. For a country i with neighbour country j in sector k and year t the variables 
can be formalised as follows: 
 
(1)  Xikt j ijk
j
MA GDPd−α=∑   (2)  Mjkt i ijk
i
SA GDPd−α=∑  
(3)  Xikt j ijk
j
HKMA HK d−α=∑  (4)  Mjkt i ijk
i
HKSA HK d−α=∑  
(5)  −α=∑ Xikt jk ijk
j
PRMA PR d  (6)  −α=∑ Mjkt ik ijk
i
PRSA PR d  
 
where MA and SA stand for market and supplier access in the goods markets, proxied by the gross 
domestic product (GDP), HKMA and HKSA represent market and supplier access in the human 
capital (HK) markets, PRMA and PRSA measure the access to productive markets and suppliers, d 
is distance and the α’s are distance coefficients (X for exports and M for imports). These α 
coefficients are taken from Marques and Metcalf (2003) and given in Appendix A. They result from 
bilateral gravity equations between the North-South, North-East and South-East country pairs. The 
bilateral flows within each country group were not included in the regressions. Thus to be able to 
compute the variables in equations (1)-(4), we use the assumption that the distance coefficient 
between two countries belonging to the same group is given by –1.  
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In Appendix C (Figs. 1, 2 and 3) we show the scatter plots of sectoral real wages against 
respectively the average of (1) and (2) (Fig. 1), the average of (3) and (4) (Fig. 2), and the average 
of (5) and (6) (Fig. 3) for each of the North, South and East country groups in the period 1990-99.5 
On the whole, the plots constitute preliminary evidence that the relationship between real wages 
and access to goods and factors markets, as well as access to productive environments, tends to 
be positive. This is true even for those industrial sectors with a smaller degree of economies of 
scale and a lower skill-intensity, such as Leather & Footwear, Minerals and Textiles & Clothing. On 
the whole, real wages react more to scale than to skill, and react even less to the neighbours’ 
productivity. This is because the latter contains two conflicting effects. One is a positive effect 
through productivity spillovers that increase real wages. Another is a negative effect operating 
through competition from productive neighbours that decreases real wages. The final outcome 
depends on the relative magnitude of these effects.  
 
There are also substantial differences among country groups. In the North (Figs. 1A and 2A) real 
wages tend to increase with access to goods and factors markets in all sectors and countries. This 
group is the most developed economically and has achieved a greater sectoral balance. A similar 
picture appears in Fig. 3A, with neighbour’s productivity enhancing real wages, except in Minerals, 
where a clear relationship does not seem to exist.  
 
In the South (Figs. 1B and 2B), the impact of market access on real wages considerably differs 
across sectors. In particular, real wages in the low scale, low skill sectors react less to market 
access and to access to human capital than other sectors. On one hand, given their low scale 
requirements they benefit less from larger markets for final goods and inputs. On the other hand, 
given their low skill requirements they also benefit less from access to skilled workers both at the 
forward and backward level. There is also a divide within the group, with real wages in Portugal and 
Greece lagging behind Spain, even though market access and especially access to human capital 
increased during the 1990s. This effect is particularly noticeable in Portugal: as a result of building 
up human capital, in the late 1990s the wage returns were high and there was a fast catching-up. 
On the contrary, Greece was less dynamic over the period. In all three Southern countries there 
was a dramatic increase in productivity during the 1990s (Fig. 3B). However, the productivity gains 
were hardly reflected on the real wages of Spain and Greece, which remained almost static. On the 
contrary, real wages in Portugal generally responded to productivity gains. Still, and despite similar 
productivity levels, Spanish real wages remained the highest in the group.  
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Perhaps the most surprising results can be found in the East (Figs. 1C and 2C), where the reaction 
of real wages to goods markets access greatly differs from the reaction to human capital markets. 
The former is positive and similar across sectors. On the contrary, the latter turns negative for 
Leather & Footwear, Metals, Textiles & Clothing, and Wood Products. The two most salient 
common factors among these sectors are the low share of FDI and the high unskilled to skilled 
labour ratio, once physical capital is controlled for (Baldwin et al. (2000). This higher ratio means a 
higher number of unskilled workers employed per extra skilled worker and thus decreases the 
average real wage in the sector. In addition, the lower presence of foreign firms also decrease the 
average productivity in the sector and thus pulls down wages. Similarly to the South, the East 
seems to be a two-tier group. Those countries lying above the regression line have higher real 
wages and increasing with access to goods and factors markets: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia. The countries lying below the regression line have lower real wages and many 
times decreasing with access to goods and, especially, factors markets: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania. Estonia is a special case, with intermediate real wages and the lowest access to goods 
and factors markets. The reason for this probably lies in its remoteness and reduced size, as well 
as the reduced size of its nearest neighbours.  
 
The East differs from North and South in that it shows the highest reactions of real wages to 
productivity gains (Fig. 3C) in sectors traditionally strong before transition, such as Chemicals, 
Machinery, Metals and Minerals. This result is not surprising, as the initial level of productivity was 
low and transition made wages responsive to market signals. However, in sectors that benefited 
from either high levels of FDI (e.g., Transport Equipment) or were subject to a substantial amount of 
outsourcing (e.g., Leather&Footwear, Textiles&Clothing, Wood Products), real wages were 
unresponsive to productivity gains. Here international competitiveness through low wages was the 
most important factor. The data clearly shows a divide between pre-transition and post-transition 
sectors. Unfortunately we only have sectoral productivity data for three Eastern countries: Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. However, even among these there are differences in behaviour: 
whereas Czech and Polish real wages tend to increase with productivity, Hungarian real wages 
have in fact decreased! More detailed information on the economies of these countries would be 
necessary in order to explain this difference. However, such is not the purpose of the present paper 
and in what follows we look at the Eastern group as an aggregate.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
5 The sectors represented in both figures from the top left corner to the bottom right corner are: Chemicals (chem), Leather 
& Footwear (leat), Machinery (mach), Metals (meta), Minerals (mine), Textiles & Clothing (text), Transport Equipment (trans) 
and Wood Products (wood). A fuller description of the build up of these aggregates is provided in Appendix B.  
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3. A Sectoral Wage Equation 
 
In this section explore country and sector differences further through formal econometric analysis. 
To that end we present an empirical model of the EU-25 based on the relationship between real 
wages and goods and factors market potentials at a sectoral level. In a NEG setting, real wages 
change as a result of three conflicting effects. First, the home market effect: wages are higher in the 
larger markets. This is an agglomeration force. Second, the competition effect: there is less 
competition in goods and factor markets in the less industrialized markets, thus wages can be fixed 
at a higher level. This is a dispersion force. Third, the price index effect: scale economies and lower 
trade costs decrease the price index of the larger markets, increasing their real wages. This is an 
agglomeration force. From the interaction of these three effects two possibilities arise. If real wages 
change inversely with the access to markets and suppliers, whenever the latter increases there will 
be an outflow of workers and/or an inflow of firms. This is an equilibrating mechanism that reduces 
wage disparities, allowing for convergence. On the contrary, if real wages change proportionately 
with the access to markets and suppliers, there will be an inflow of workers and/or an outflow of 
firms and agglomeration follows.   
 
This study applies Hanson’s procedure to the EU-25. We directly test wages gradients using a 
panel dataset. We believe this is the first econometric study of such relationship in the context of an 
enlarged EU and at a sectoral level. This is the more important in a highly heterogeneous group of 
25 countries that have very different real wages and in which we can expect a differentiated 
behaviour of industrial sectors with different characteristics. The equation to estimate for country i, 
sector k, year t is given by:6 
  
(7)           
 
 
 
 
= β + β + β +β + β + 
 
+β + β + β + β +
+β + β + β + α + µ
ikt
ikt ikt0 1 it 2 3 4 it
ikt
ikt ikt5 6 7 it 8 it
ikt ikt9 ikt 10 11 i ikt
Wln ln(GDP ) ln(MA ) ln(SA ) ln(HK )
P
ln(HKMA ) ln(HKSA ) ln(U ) ln(AC )
ln(PR ) ln(PRMA ) ln(PRSA )
 
 
with W the wage, P the price index, GDP the gross domestic product, MA the estimated goods 
market access, SA the estimated goods supplier access, HKMA the estimated human capital 
market access, HKSA the estimated human capital supplier access, U the unemployment rate, AC 
                                                     
6 An alternative specification was estimated where the unemployment and activity rates were replaced with their interaction. 
While the overall results are similar, there is some loss of information as it is not possible to know whether the interaction 
effect is due to either the unemployment or activity rate. However, as shown in Tables 7 and 8, the two variables behave 
differently. As an example, in the East the interaction variable is generally not significant, but the activity rate is very 
significant for all sectors. 
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the percentage of active population, PR the sectoral productivity, PRMA access to productivity of 
markets, PRSA access to productivity of suppliers, and α country dummies.  
 
The GDP, MA, SA, HK, HKMA and HKSA variables derive directly from NEG theory, as well as the 
PRMA and PRSA constructions. As shown in Section 2, these variables can generally be expected 
to influence real wages positively. In the estimation we distinguish the own effects (GDP, HK, PR) 
from the purely external effects (MA, SA, HKMA, HKSA, PRMA, PRSA). The own productivity is 
expected to increase wages. The productivity of the neighbours should increase wages if it 
complements the own productivity, but decrease them if it acts as a substitute. The remaining 
variables control for countries’ idiosyncrasies. In particular, the country dummies are expected to 
capture the country-specific institutional arrangements that influence the labour market outcomes 
and the macroeconomic policies that determine the price levels. The dummies for each country 
group are estimated with reference to the country with highest real wages in that group. Thus a 
negative sign would indicate that there are country-specific characteristics driving real wages down, 
e.g., labour market rigidities and/or an inflationary macroeconomic policy with respect to the leading 
country. In our sample, the countries with highest real wages are Denmark in EU-North, Spain in 
EU-South and the Czech Republic in EU-East.7 Unemployment and the active share of population 
should drive wages down by providing firms with an available pool of workers that can replace 
those currently employed. In what follows we compare these theoretical conjectures with the actual 
estimation results. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
We consider the EU is composed of three country groups – EU-North (N), EU-South (S) and EU-
East (E) – that differ in the skill endowment as well as both spatial and non-spatial trade costs. In 
this framework, N is a hub and has a higher skill endowment, this is, more skilled workers per 
capita, than the two peripheries S and E. Sectors also differ in their characteristics, namely 
economies of scale and skill-intensity. We have these differences into account when estimating 
equation (7). Thus we regress the real wages of the three country groups for four groups of sectors 
distinguished by degree of economies of scale as in Pratten (1988) and skill-intensity as in Baldwin 
et al. (2000). These four groups are as follows: Chemicals, Machinery and Transport Equipment are 
high scale economies and high skill-intensive, Metals are high scale economies and low skill-
                                                     
7 As explained in Section 2, the Eastern sectoral productivity data was available only for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland and thus only these countries were included in the regression sample. This however does not change the overall 
results as these three countries dominate the group of ten in terms of size and wealth. As can be seen in Section 2, the 
Czech Republic remains the country with highest real wages even when all Eastern countries are included. Alternative 
regressions (not reported) were run with all the ten countries but removing the productivity variables. The overall results are 
very similar to those reported in the paper.  
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intensive, Leather & Footwear, Minerals and Textiles & Clothing are low scale economies and low 
skill-intensive, and Wood Products are low scale economies and high skill-intensive. A full 
description of the data sources is provided in Appendix B.  
 
Estimation is carried out through the Prais-Winsten regression with correlated Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSEs), which assumes that the disturbances are heteroskedastic (each country 
has its own variance) and contemporaneously correlated across countries (each pair of countries 
has their own covariance). The full estimation results are provided in Appendix C. It should be noted 
that the results must be interpreted with caution as the initial number of observations was not very 
large and there was a number of missing values. This initial data was interpolated and extrapolated 
to increase the number of observations, which as reported in Appendix C is still not more than 100, 
though it is not less than 26.8  
 
The country dummies indicate country-specific characteristics that drive real wages below those of 
the leading country. These can be institutional arrangements that make labour markets more rigid 
or inflationary macroeconomic policies. In the North, both Belgium and the Netherlands have such 
country-specific factors against Denmark in all sectors, and Austria, France, Germany, Sweden and 
the UK exhibit those factors in the low scale, high skill sectors. In the South, both Greece and 
Portugal’s country-specific characteristics drive real wages in high scale, high skill sectors below the 
Spanish level. In the case of Portugal this is also true in low scale, high skill sectors. In the East, 
Hungary has a disadvantage relative to the Czech Republic in high scale sectors, whereas Poland 
is at odds with low skill sectors. In Tables 1-11 we analyse in more detail a summary of the main 
effects and respective p-values for the different country groups and sectors considered.9 
 
The first group of variables 
relates to NEG theory and 
measures a country’s own size 
(Table 1) and that of its 
neighbours (Tables 2 and 3). 
According to theory, if the home 
market and the price index effects prevail, real wages will increase in the larger markets. An 
example is the low scale, high skill sectors in the North and East. Here there seems to be a skill 
effect, with more differentiated products allowing for more market power, thus increasing prices and 
wages. But if the competition effect in the goods and labour markets is more important, real wages 
                                                     
8 The scatter plots of real and interpolated data (available upon request) show that the overall trends are not substantially 
altered. In addition, whenever the original number of observations allowed it, we ran real data regressions. The results were 
very similar to the interpolated data counterparts.   
9 The coefficients and p-values shown are the average of models 1 and 2 in Appendix A.   
Table 1: Home market 
 
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.595 0.131 1.229*** 0.030 
S -5.997*** -0.062 -2.908** 6.023 
E -0.080 0.282 1.099*** 0.288 
 10
will increase in the smaller markets. This happens in high skill sectors in the South. As we have 
shown in Section 2, Southern wages have not increased according to size, as Portuguese wages 
increased more than Spanish or Greek ones. The lack of significance in low skill sectors shows that 
the sample countries are mostly wage takers, as international competitiveness in these sectors is 
maintained mostly through low wages.  
 
There are two variables 
measuring the importance of the 
size of the neighbours: market 
access (Table 2) and supplier 
access (Table 3). Good market 
access very substantially raises 
Southern wages in high scale, high skill sectors, and Eastern wages in high scale, low skill sectors. 
The competition effect in goods markets prevails in the East’s low scale, high skill sectors and the 
North’s low scale, low skill sectors. When significant, the signs are positive in high scale sectors and 
negative in low scale sectors. This is mostly a scale effect coming out of the interplay between 
advantages from concentration and from locating close to markets and suppliers. In high scale 
sectors, the gain from concentrating exceeds the loss from being further away from markets and 
suppliers. An increase in market access always decreases production costs and allows the firm to 
increase wages, at the same time lowering the price index. The result is an increase in real wages. 
In low scale sectors, concentration gains do not compensate the increase in transport costs. Thus 
better market access may in fact increase the overall firm’s costs by increasing concentration and 
as a result real wages decrease.   
 
The access to suppliers, when 
significant, always increases real 
wages. Examples are high skill 
sectors in the peripheries and 
high scale, low skill in the North. 
Better access to suppliers means 
lower transport costs and thus lower cost of inputs. This decreases the price index and allows real 
wages to increase. The marginal effects are higher for low scale sectors as these are more affected 
by transport costs. Generally, in Tables 1 to 3, the marginal effects on real wages are higher for 
South and East than for North. This confirms the latter’s position as a hub: as it already has a 
locational advantage, any improvements would bring reduced marginal gains. In addition, a 
multinational firms effect is apparent in the Southern high scale, high skill sectors as both access to 
suppliers and markets influence real wages positively, but the size of the home market influences 
real wages negatively. Thus the real wages paid in these sectors have grown in the South not due 
Table 2: Market access 
 
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.895 -2.004 0.272 -0.240*** 
S 6.615*** -3.320 -2.644 -5.242 
E 1.313 6.281* -0.431* 1.949 
Table 3: Supplier access 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N -0.034 3.184* -0.393 1.658 
S 0.914* 3.146 6.406*** -0.027 
E 1.828 -4.113 5.632*** 0.185 
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to the home market but due to the action of external markets and/or firms. These sectors are 
dependent on both external suppliers and markets. 
 
We now turn to factor markets, 
more exactly the market for 
skilled labour: own human capital 
endowments (Table 4), access to 
human capital markets (Table 5) 
and access to human capital 
suppliers (Table 6). In the East, the effect of own endowments on wages is always positive when 
significant, meaning that demand effects overcome supply effects. In high scale sectors, due to 
large FDI inflows, human capital is in high demand relatively to supply, driving up wages. Moreover, 
as Eastern labour markets were liberalised, wages responded more freely to market forces. In 
Western Europe, the responsiveness of wages to endowments has already achieved a threshold 
and the only significant reaction is actually negative (North’s low scale, high skill).  
 
The access to markets abundant 
in human capital decreases real 
wages when significant. This 
happens in low scale, high skill 
sectors for the North and East. 
There is no wage premium 
associated with producing for sophisticated markets as these are also more competitive and 
consumers are more demanding. They would be willing to accept higher prices only for products 
originating from distant suppliers. As market access improves, prices are driven down and so are 
wages. 
 
The access to human capital 
suppliers adds to the own 
endowments and it could either 
complement or substitute it. 
Foreign human capital is a 
complement to own human 
capital in the North in low scale, high skill sectors. These require a relatively high proportion of 
skilled labour and, being low scale, are relatively localised. In the East, foreign human capital 
substitutes for local human capital in high scale, high skill and low scale, low skill sectors. These 
have seen foreign networks grow, either through FDI or outsourcing. However, local employment is 
Table 4: Endowments 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.014 -0.111 -0.172* 0.072 
S -0.144 -0.317 0.198 -0.439 
E 1.526*** 0.779*** -0.096 0.663 
Table 5: Human capital market access 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.225 0.100 -0.456*** -0.058 
S 0.453 -0.073 -0.473 0.738 
E 0.072 -2.672 -2.102*** 1.593 
Table 6: Human capital suppliers access 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.066 0.101 0.457*** 0.002 
S -0.019 0.949 0.640 -0.941 
E -1.189*** 0.682 -0.384 -3.750** 
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made mostly of unskilled workers as multinationals resort to skilled workers from their countries of 
origin. 
 
We use three control variables 
that account for different 
country/sector characteristics. 
The first is labour productivity, 
defined as the sectoral 
production per worker (Table 7). 
In the North productivity tends to have a negative effect on real wages in all sectors except low 
scale, low skill. Several explanations for this result can be put forward. One relates to technology 
improvements that allow the introduction of more capital-intensive techniques. The increase in 
labour productivity may be due to less employment rather than more production. Thus the demand 
for labour decreases and real wages decrease as well. Disney et al. (2003) study the relationship 
between restructuring and productivity in the UK. They find a positive impact of both internal and 
external restructuring on productivity of UK firms, partly because of the introduction of more capital-
intensive techniques. This reduces labour demand and, holding labour supply constant, it drives 
wages down. A second reason has to do with the introduction of capital also inducing substitution of 
unskilled for skilled workers. Thus, even if wages respond to productivity, as unskilled wages are 
lower than skilled wages, on average real wages may decrease. Finally, there is a competition 
effect from more efficient firms in the sector that compresses real wages downwards. In the South 
real wages are unresponsive to productivity, as shown in Section 2. There it was also shown that 
Hungarian real wages decrease with productivity, whereas Czech and Polish real wages increase. 
This behaviour renders the coefficients in Table 7 insignificant for the East, though they remain 
positive. The only exception is low scale, high skill sectors, where productivity significantly 
increases real wages. This can be explained through a positive spillover argument according to 
which inefficient firms are forced to become more productive thus being able to pay higher wages. 
 
Similarly to GDP and human 
capital, we can think of the 
influence of the neighbours’ 
productivity on a country’s real 
wages. These are affected by the 
productivity of markets (Table 8) 
and of suppliers (Table 9). The effect of access to productive markets on real wages, when 
significant, is always negative. This is because a country that has very productive neighbours has to 
either increase its own productivity or to keep its wages low to remain competitive. The latter 
solution is easier to achieve in the short run. Examples are high scale, high skill sectors in the East, 
Table 7: Productivity 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N -0.036*** -0.106** -0.013* 0.018 
S 0.008 -0.024 0.007 0.002 
E 0.060 0.032 0.116*** 0.106 
Table 8: Productivity market access 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N -0.222 0.012 0.022 -0.420** 
S 0.080 0.291 -0.115*** 0.009 
E -0.153*** 0.128 -0.023*** 0.183 
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low scale, high skill sectors in the peripheries and low scale, low skill sectors in the North. In 
addition, the comment made before about the downskilling due to more capital-intensive techniques 
would also apply here. 
 
The productivity of suppliers has 
a significantly negative impact on 
real wages only in the East in low 
scale, high skill sectors. This 
sector (Wood Products) is 
partially dependent on natural 
resources and, as the more skill-intensive stages are not related to the supply of inputs, a negative 
effect of closer productive suppliers would be expected. 
 
The second control variable is 
the country’s general 
unemployment rate (Table 10), 
that indicates how easily current 
workers may be replaced and 
how easy it is to draw extra 
workers. Both tend to drive down wages in the South. There is however a perverse effect in the 
East (except high scale, high skill sectors), where unemployment drives wages upwards. The 
positive effect of unemployment on wages is the product of industrial restructuring. It is especially 
noticeable in the East during the transition period, when both unemployment and wages increased 
as market forces drove out inefficient workers and firms. In high scale, high skill sectors the FDI 
flows prevented a significant link between unemployment and wages. The North’s low scale, high 
skill sectors also show a positive link between unemployment and wages. 
 
 The third control variable is the 
activity rate, defined as the share 
of active population in the 
country’s total population (Table 
11). This is mainly dependent on 
demographic and social factors 
that however differ across countries. Some examples are the extent of the ageing phenomenon and 
the participation rate of women. Similarly to the unemployment rate, the activity rate provides a 
measure of the ease of labour force replacement and/or augmentation. The smaller the pool of 
inactive people the less options there are for employers, who are forced to pay higher wages. Thus 
the activity rate should have a positive effect on wages. In fact, for the East the effect is always 
Table 9: Productivity supplier access 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.162 -0.040 0.010 0.325 
S -0.206 -0.297 0.072 -0.102 
E 0.046 -0.092 -0.224*** -0.307 
Table 10: Unemployment 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N 0.016 0.005 0.081*** 0.008 
S -0.459*** -0.192** -0.226** 0.240 
E 0.031 0.152** 0.287*** 0.192*** 
Table 11: Activity rate 
  
High scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity
High scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
Low scale 
economies and 
high skill-intensity 
Low scale 
economies and 
low skill-intensity
N -0.387 -0.529* 0.097 0.206 
S -1.420 -0.610 0.016 4.192 
E 4.506*** 2.251** 4.600*** 2.500*** 
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positive and even more so in the sectors that require relatively more skilled labour. This is because 
skilled workers are scarcer and thus competition for workers is fiercer in these sectors, driving 
wages upwards. However, for the North the effect is negative in high scale, low skill sectors. This 
behaviour can be better understood if we think about the competition that a greater activity rate 
creates in the labour market, thus driving wages down. 
 
Previous studies estimated a wage equation where wages are a function of market and supplier 
access and also of access to a pool of skilled workers. In turn these variables are distance-weighted 
averages of incomes and human capital using distance coefficients taken from a gravity model. 
Examples at an aggregate level are Hanson (1997, 1998) on NAFTA and Redding and Venables 
(2001) and Venables (2001) in a worldwide context. Like ours, these studies conclude that wages 
increase with proximity to markets and suppliers. Hanson (1997, 1998) finds that in Mexico nominal 
wages decrease with the distance from industrial centres but were not influenced by NAFTA trade 
liberalisation. However the movement of people was not considered in the study and it refers to 
observable data rather than projecting into the future. Venables (2001) finds two European wage 
gradients, one from the EU core to Greece, Portugal and Spain, and another from Western to 
Eastern Europe. These are however aggregate wages and do not distinguish sectoral effects. Using 
regional data for respectively Canada and the UK, Hunt and Mueller (2002) and Monastiriotis 
(2002) conclude that regions with more human capital tend to have higher average wages.  
 
Our results are not directly comparable with these previous studies. The scope in terms of countries 
and sectors differs as we use an exclusively European sample and disaggregate industrial sectors. 
By doing this, we additionally find that the effects on specific sectors can be much higher than 
suggested by aggregate data, and have shown how different the results are across sectors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have estimated a sectoral wage equation for three regional blocs of the enlarged 
EU that we defined as North, South and East. We are now able to characterise the factors that 
influenced changes in real wages during the 1990s in our sample countries and sectors. Though 
the overall relationship either between size, endowments or productivity and real wages is positive, 
these react more to size, less to endowments and even less to productivity. These reactions, when 
significant, also differ among countries and sectors when we jointly regress real wages. Sectorally, 
the most consistent result is that in all countries market access increases wages of high scale 
sectors but decreases wages of low scale sectors. This is because the former gain more in scale 
economies than they lose in transport costs, whereas the opposite is true for the latter.   
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The model works particularly well for the East, with own size, endowments, productivity, 
unemployment and activity rates having a positive effect on real wages. The Eastern economies 
particularly benefit from opening to foreign markets, especially in high scale sectors. At the same 
time, they are subject to competition effects from foreign skills and productivity. The model also 
shows that in the North own size and unemployment rate increase real wages, but these show 
threshold effects in own human capital, productivity and activity rates as high levels have already 
been achieved. As Northern countries are more productive than their EU neighbours, their real 
wages are not affected by other’s productivity. However, real wages increase with the suppliers’ 
size and skill but decrease with the markets’ size and skill. Thus suppliers complement internal 
production, which competes in external markets. In the South, real wages are negatively affected by 
own size and unemployment as real wages increased the most in Portugal, the country with lowest 
levels of these variables. The size of markets and suppliers alone increases real wages, whereas 
the Southern countries are subject to a competition effect in productive markets.  
 
Our results come as a support of recent developments in the EU’s Agenda 2000, which has been a 
first step in the right direction by emphasising different roles for the EU’s Regional Policy. The latter 
should in fact be a mix of policies, focussing on both income and education/skills, together with 
infrastructure development. This last aspect has successfully benefited Southern Europe and the 
same would be expected in Eastern Europe. The support of Regional Policy may be particularly 
important to compensate the market forces that tend to increase real wages where they are already 
higher. In particular, even if the real wages in the EU as a whole increase, we should bear in mind 
the possibility of an uneven change across different regions of the EU. In addition, the EU’s 
Regional Policy should be increasingly sector-specific as the behaviour of sectoral wages differs 
from the aggregate.   
 
What has been said in the European context may be extrapolated at the worldwide level. 
Developing countries that suffer from poor market access, low human capital endowments and low 
productivity are failing to converge. Institutions such as the World Bank would have a role, adopting 
a balanced mix of policies, fostering both income and education/skill levels, together with 
infrastructure improvement. The policy mix should be less general and pay attention to the 
particular characteristics of countries and sectors that it seeks to influence.  
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Appendix A 
Distance Coefficients (as estimated in Marques and Metcalf 2003) 
 
 
N-E N-S S-E 
Panel Corrected  
Standard Errors Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Exports -1.030 -1.141 -2.072 -1.224 -1.574 -3.587 Chemicals 
Imports -1.426 -1.398 -0.331 -0.050 -2.070 -1.455 
Exports -2.515 -2.570 -3.045 -3.211 -1.173 -0.770 Leather 
Imports -0.984 -1.442 -2.800 -2.984 -0.325 0.371 
Exports -1.418 -1.754 -0.543 -0.595 -2.021 -1.732 Machinery 
Imports -0.840 -0.766 -0.319 0.236 -4.608 -2.172 
Exports -1.957 -2.136 -0.435 0.169 -1.133 -2.050 Metals 
Imports -1.776 -2.328 -0.877 -0.454 -3.913 -3.101 
Exports -2.201 -2.103 -1.972 -2.138 -0.783 -2.627 Minerals 
Imports -1.742 -2.100 -0.471 -0.797 -4.609 -4.235 
Exports -2.159 -2.223 -2.520 -2.432 -0.569 -0.962 Textiles 
Imports -1.295 -1.501 -0.644 -0.339 -1.666 -1.554 
Exports -2.378 -2.528 -1.353 -1.085 -3.858 -1.799 Transport  
Equipment Imports -2.082 -3.051 -1.147 -1.135 -0.350 -1.558 
Exports -2.270 -2.361 -0.325 -0.285 -2.110 -2.627 Wood 
Imports -0.822 -0.984 -2.119 -1.111 -1.543 -2.784 
 
 
NOTE: Model 1 is defined as  
= β + β + β + β + β + β + β
+ β + β + β +
+kijt it 1 jt 2 it 3 jt 4 it 5 jt 6 ij 7
k
ij 8 ijt 9 ijt 10 ijt
TRADE POP POP GDPPC GDPPC HKPC HKPC DIST
                 BORDER EA EURO u
 
 
and Model 2 is defined as  
k k
ijt it 1 jt 2 ijt 3 t 4 ij 5 ij 6 ijt 7 ijt 8 ijt
TRADE POP POP ECDIST HKDIST DIST BORDER EA EURO u= β + β + β + β + β + β + β + β + . 
where the dependent variable is either exports or imports between countries I and j for sector k, year t. 
The coefficients reported above correspond to β7 in Model 1 and to β5 in Model 2. 
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Appendix B 
Data Sources 
 
Data is taken for the transition period (1990-99), for the following industrial aggregates: 
• ISIC Rev. 2: chemicals (35), leather products (323, 324), machinery (382, 383), metals (37, 
381), minerals (36), textiles and clothing (321, 322), transport equipment (384), and wood 
products (33); 
• ISIC Rev. 3: chemicals (24), leather products (19), machinery (29, 30, 31), metals (27, 28), 
minerals (26), textiles and clothing (17, 18), transport equipment (34, 35), and wood 
products (20, 36). 
 
 
Data on wages, prices, employment, unemployment and labour force is provided by the 
International Labour Organisation’s Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Industrial production data was 
taken from OECD’s Industrial Structure Statistics.  
 
The remaining variables are composites that use the coefficients provided in Appendix A, together 
with distance, GDP and human capital data. Distance data was taken from the CEPII website 
(www.cepii.fr) and it is measured in km between the sample countries’ economic centres. These 
correspond to the capital city except for Germany (Hamburg is the city used). GDP data was taken 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Human capital is proxied by a schooling variable 
given by the number of people with tertiary education studies. This number was obtained from the 
Barro-Lee dataset for 1990 and then added of the yearly number of enrolments. The enrolment data 
was taken from the OECD Education Statistics and UNESCO Statistics of Educational Attainment 
and Literacy.     
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Appendix C 
Regression Resultsi 
 
North South East Chemicals 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 0.184   (0.206) 
0.099   
(0.208) 
-7.719*** 
(1.042) 
-9.121*** 
(1.287) 
-0.062   
(0.081) 
-0.044   
(0.083) 
ma 3.024*** (1.108) 
2.739** 
(1.155) 
3.166*** 
(0.858) 
6.696** 
(3.108) 
5.132*** 
(1.042) 
6.371   
(1.496) 
sa -1.635*** (0.670) 
-1.189* 
(0.650) 
5.407*** 
(0.816) 
4.159   
(4.049) 
0.494   
(0.598) 
-0.741   
(0.850) 
hk 0.067   (0.136) 
0.061   
(0.162) 
0.828*** 
(0.078) 
0.791*** 
(0.131) 
0.995*** 
(0.257) 
1.029   
(0.301) 
hkma 0.854*** (0.328) 
0.754** 
(0.392) 
0.320** 
(0.132) 
0.809   
(0.672) 
1.731*** 
(0.430) 
2.322* 
(0.655) 
hksa -0.122   (0.154) 
-0.099   
(0.126) 
-0.783*** 
(0.222) 
-0.401   
(0.519) 
-3.197*** 
(0.740) 
-3.870* 
(0.964) 
pr -0.058** (0.027) 
-0.060** 
(0.030) 
-0.095*** 
(0.024) 
-0.056** 
(0.028) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
0.049*** 
(0.019) 
prma -0.066** (0.034) 
-0.071** 
(0.036) 
0.078*** 
(0.011) 
0.074   
(0.053) 
-0.148*** 
(0.053) 
-0.168*** 
(0.068) 
prsa -0.028   (0.021) 
-0.015   
(0.014) 
-0.240*** 
(0.045) 
-0.413*** 
(0.126) 
-0.058   
(0.045) 
-0.043*** 
(0.066) 
u 0.012   (0.032) 
0.005   
(0.034) 
-0.662*** 
(0.045) 
-0.628*** 
(0.115) 
0.004   
(0.030) 
0.016  
(0.030) 
active -0.386   (0.257) 
-0.393   
(0.278) 
1.346*** 
(0.361) 
1.184*** 
(0.470) 
1.921*** 
(0.477) 
1.820  
(0.457) 
aus 0.871* (0.488) 
0.920* 
(0.520) 
    
bel -1.412*** (0.241) 
-1.561*** 
(0.328) 
    
fin 2.434*** (0.940) 
2.410** 
(1.050) 
    
fra 0.110   (0.580) 
-0.058   
(0.539) 
    
ger 0.962   (0.766) 
1.099   
(0.785) 
    
ire 1.112* (0.598) 
0.780   
(0.573) 
    
ned -0.986*** (0.208) 
-1.058*** 
(0.256)     
swe 1.573** (0.684) 
1.632** 
(0.777)     
uk 0.323   (0.442) 
0.226   
(0.415)     
gre   -13.603*** (1.759) 
-14.127*** 
(2.214)   
por   -18.774*** (2.972) 
-19.069*** 
(2.239)   
hun     2.296*** (0.563) 
2.386*** 
(0.641) 
pol     0.377   (0.660) 
0.414* 
(0.756) 
constant -37.266*** (12.241) 
-36.110*** 
(11.146) 
-1.802   
(12.726) 
-22.643   
(34.445) 
-136.358*** 
(20.768) 
-133.999*** 
(22.065) 
No. obs. 99 99 30 30 28 28 
R2 0.9965 0.9954   0.9966  
Wald Chi2  8920.37*** 10073.93*** 8099.68*** 3301.89*** 9737.93*** 8198.95*** 
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North South East Leather & 
footwear Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp -0.181*** (0.060) 
0.012   
(0.055) 
-1.136   
(0.866) 
0.210   
(0.377) 
0.524** 
(0.241) 
0.248*** 
(0.190) 
ma -6.558*** (0.818) 
-9.076*** 
(0.729) 
1.246   
(0.847) 
-0.371   
(0.696) 
0.172   
(0.944) 
-0.690   
(3.369) 
sa 7.182*** (0.890) 
9.573*** 
(0.736) 
-0.063   
(0.241) 
0.117   
(0.631) 
-0.101   
(1.004) 
1.314** 
(2.783) 
hk 0.101*** (0.029) 
0.161*** 
(0.038) 
0.245** 
(0.120) 
0.237   
(0.171) 
0.854* 
(0.450) 
0.934** 
(0.302) 
hkma -0.747*** (0.197) 
-0.519   
(1.393) 
0.524* 
(0.307) 
1.614   
(1.775) 
-0.236   
(1.548) 
1.379** 
(2.249) 
hksa 0.874*** (0.263) 
0.501   
(1.415) 
-0.819** 
(0.401) 
-1.682   
(1.552) 
-1.648*** 
(0.671) 
-2.567*** 
(1.488) 
pr 0.005   (0.003) 
-0.003   
(0.004) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.033   
(0.028) 
0.078** 
(0.040) 
0.129   
(0.029) 
prma -0.261*** (0.052) 
-1.820*** 
(0.345) 
-0.007   
(0.016) 
0.001   
(0.018) 
0.101*** 
(0.034) 
0.413*** 
(0.133) 
prsa 0.200*** (0.054) 
1.759*** 
(0.344) 
0.002   
(0.011) 
-0.002   
(0.006) 
-0.414* 
(0.219) 
-0.837*** 
(0.211) 
u 0.037*** (0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
-0.132*** 
(0.045) 
-0.097* 
(0.057) 
0.303*** 
(0.091) 
0.232  
(0.066) 
active 0.699*** (0.111) 
0.296*** 
(0.121) 
0.244   
(0.335) 
0.198   
(0.349) 
2.866*** 
(0.827) 
1.823  
(0.757) 
aus -1.048*** (0.132) 
-1.069*** 
(0.129) 
    
bel -0.650*** (0.061) 
-0.886*** 
(0.064) 
    
fin -0.583*** (0.121) 
-0.744*** 
(0.099) 
    
fra -0.237   (0.181) 
-0.941*** 
(0.182) 
    
ger -0.260   (0.229) 
-1.084*** 
(0.219) 
    
ire -0.527*** (0.033) 
-0.577*** 
(0.031) 
    
ned       
swe -0.344*** (0.115) 
-0.604*** 
(0.097)     
uk -0.269* (0.148) 
-0.890*** 
(0.148)     
gre   -2.778* (1.512) 
-1.455   
(1.605)   
por   -4.905** (2.506) 
-0.060   
(0.866)   
hun     -0.313   (0.470) 
-0.685*** 
(0.412) 
pol     -2.793*** (0.504) 
-1.937*** 
(0.525) 
constant -12.940*** (2.324) 
-12.404*** 
(1.327) 
11.407   
(9.225) 
11.026   
(15.185) 
-12.908   
(29.123) 
-12.645*** 
(22.963) 
No. obs. 90 90 30 30 30 30 
R2   0.9741 0.99 0.9841  
Wald Chi2  15039.27*** 31645.46*** 2043.28*** 2705.82*** 1062.97*** 1667.41*** 
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North South East Machinery 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 0.337*** (0.108) 
0.430** 
(0.193) 
-2.834*** 
(0.979) 
-3.159*** 
(1.012) 
-0.444*** 
(0.142) 
-0.533*** 
(0.141) 
ma 0.339   (0.842) 
0.584   
(1.157) 
  -1.055   
(1.896) 
-0.988*** 
(0.880) 
sa -0.221   (0.775) 
-0.265   
(0.978) 
4.229*** 
(1.328) 
4.627*** 
(1.369) 
3.131   
(2.112) 
3.346*** 
(1.832) 
hk 0.015   (0.035) 
-0.027   
(0.075) 
0.511*** 
(0.121) 
0.586*** 
(0.125) 
2.991*** 
(0.392) 
2.820*** 
(0.410) 
hkma -0.031   (0.222) 
-0.261   
(0.247) 
-1.410   
(7.119) 
-2.196   
(2.658) 
-1.448   
(1.145) 
-0.892*** 
(1.037) 
hksa 0.218   (0.210) 
0.321* 
(0.175) 
1.147   
(6.926) 
1.886   
(2.483) 
1.491*** 
(0.360) 
1.095*** 
(0.366) 
pr 0.099*** (0.012) 
0.099*** 
(0.021) 
0.087   
(0.093) 
0.142   
(0.091) 
0.004   
(0.047) 
-0.015   
(0.047) 
prma -0.209*** (0.028) 
-0.277*** 
(0.064) 
-0.049   
(0.738) 
0.025   
(0.237) 
-0.190*** 
(0.062) 
-0.172*** 
(0.064) 
prsa 0.143*** (0.023) 
0.208*** 
(0.053) 
-0.099   
(0.704) 
-0.162   
(0.198) 
-0.001   
(0.114) 
0.036*** 
(0.125) 
u -0.007   (0.017) 
0.009   
(0.028) 
-0.313*** 
(0.071) 
-0.348*** 
(0.077) 
0.014   
(0.058) 
-0.007  
(0.054) 
active -0.063   (0.121) 
0.057   
(0.193) 
0.720   
(0.447) 
0.429   
(0.475) 
5.885*** 
(1.062) 
5.916  
(0.912) 
aus       
bel       
fin -0.678*** (0.257) 
-0.572   
(0.739) 
    
fra -1.705*** (0.260) 
-1.697*** 
(0.470) 
    
ger -1.457*** (0.386) 
-1.515** 
(0.669) 
    
ire -0.776*** (0.147) 
-0.637*** 
(0.204) 
    
ned -0.902*** (0.112) 
-0.880*** 
(0.281)     
swe -0.739*** (0.219) 
-0.705   
(0.601)     
uk -1.268*** (0.244) 
-1.290*** 
(0.377)     
gre   -5.346*** (1.556) 
-6.739*** 
(1.765)   
por   -5.433*** (1.616) 
-6.777*** 
(1.837)   
hun     0.863   (0.683) 
1.095*** 
(0.700) 
pol     -2.823*** (0.879) 
-2.422*** 
(0.809) 
constant -11.834*** (2.234) 
-18.834*** 
(6.624) 
-45.043*** 
(16.170) 
-74.116*** 
(19.759) 
-109.528*** 
(30.902) 
-115.569*** 
(35.143) 
No. obs. 80 80 30 30 29 29*** 
R2  0.9976   0.9834 0.9712*** 
Wald Chi2  9580.37*** 3018.27*** 5398.54*** 7851.54*** 1289.33*** 1094.07** 
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North South East Metals 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 0.163   (0.159) 
0.099   
(0.225) 
-0.306   
(0.758) 
0.182   
(0.648) 
0.700*** 
(0.138) 
-0.137   
(0.113) 
ma -1.970** (0.953) 
-2.039   
(1.854) 
-5.946   
(6.501) 
-0.693   
(0.840) 
9.396*** 
(1.297) 
3.166   
(2.258) 
sa 3.341*** (1.222) 
3.027   
(2.068) 
6.079   
(6.698) 
 -6.416*** 
(1.000) 
-1.811   
(1.571) 
hk -0.094   (0.082) 
-0.128   
(0.085) 
0.077   
(0.152) 
0.213** 
(0.110) 
0.407** 
(0.187) 
1.150*** 
(0.329) 
hkma 0.034   (0.119) 
0.165   
(0.315) 
-1.345   
(2.884) 
-0.711   
(3.414) 
-0.800   
(2.982) 
-4.545   
(17.100) 
hksa 0.184   (0.130) 
0.017   
(0.350) 
1.912   
(3.116) 
1.200   
(3.588) 
-1.789   
(3.083) 
3.153   
(17.087) 
pr -0.119*** (0.033) 
-0.093** 
(0.045) 
-0.032   
(0.060) 
-0.015   
(0.059) 
0.065*** 
(0.023) 
-0.002   
(0.035) 
prma -0.012   (0.017) 
0.037   
(0.026) 
0.179   
(0.226) 
0.403** 
(0.177) 
0.282*** 
(0.044) 
-0.026   
(0.036) 
prsa -0.050   (0.038) 
-0.031   
(0.038) 
-0.206   
(0.229) 
-0.389** 
(0.176) 
-0.215*** 
(0.039) 
0.032   
(0.079) 
u -0.002   (0.019) 
0.013   
(0.030) 
-0.174* 
(0.101) 
-0.209*** 
(0.071) 
0.202*** 
(0.038) 
0.102* 
(0.055) 
active -0.687*** (0.192) 
-0.370   
(0.259) 
-0.613   
(0.437) 
-0.711** 
(0.314) 
3.210*** 
(0.592) 
1.292* 
(0.745) 
aus 1.057** (0.500) 
-0.104   
(0.212) 
    
bel -1.213*** (0.158) 
-1.316*** 
(0.530) 
    
fin 2.050*** (0.809) 
0.703   
(0.800) 
    
fra 0.057   (0.566) 
-1.249** 
(0.599) 
    
ger 1.079   (0.766) 
0.000   
(0.680) 
    
ire 0.469   (0.507) 
-0.808*** 
(0.177) 
    
ned -0.795*** (0.148) 
-0.873** 
(0.382)     
swe 1.273** (0.622) 
0.356   
(0.606)     
uk 0.117   (0.431) 
-0.723   
(0.499)     
gre   0.185   (1.897) 
-0.607   
(1.287)   
por   -0.342   (1.719) 
-0.490   
(1.287)   
hun     0.261   (0.190) 
-0.605*** 
(0.243) 
pol     -2.388*** (0.313) 
-2.083*** 
(0.556) 
constant -28.376*** (6.824) 
-13.919** 
(6.280) 
51.985   
(46.012) 
13.376   
(19.005) 
-74.703*** 
(6.142) 
-33.179*** 
(11.536) 
No. obs. 98 98 30 30 30 30 
R2 0.998 0.9762     
Wald Chi2  12424.79*** 3203.52*** 5850.55*** 6294.31*** 3917.74*** 1006.12*** 
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North South East Minerals 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 0.061   (0.330) 
-0.374*** 
(0.061) 
7.365   
(4.595) 
29.062** 
(13.722) 
0.003   
(0.183) 
-0.098* 
(0.052) 
ma 3.082* (1.669) 
0.993*** 
(0.121) 
-19.221*** 
(2.801) 
-14.054   
(10.827) 
2.302*** 
(0.851) 
1.524*** 
(0.335) 
sa -1.234   (1.306) 
-0.039   
(0.091) 
21.530   
(15.872) 
-19.887   
(14.888) 
-0.365   
(0.435) 
-0.133   
(0.267) 
hk 0.082   (0.131) 
0.082*** 
(0.013) 
-1.193   
(1.560) 
-2.348   
(2.602) 
1.148*** 
(0.306) 
1.441*** 
(0.271) 
hkma 0.438   (0.385) 
-0.068   
(0.104) 
3.303   
(8.469) 
-0.864   
(1.798) 
1.246* 
(0.720) 
0.410   
(0.293) 
hksa -0.702* (0.407) 
0.053   
(0.119) 
-2.488   
(2.448) 
-0.470   
(4.910) 
-2.865** 
(1.364) 
-1.537*** 
(0.552) 
pr -0.004   (0.023) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.501* 
(0.274) 
0.303   
(0.746) 
0.027   
(0.029) 
-0.008   
(0.027) 
prma -0.056   (0.047) 
-0.063*** 
(0.004) 
-0.137   
(0.246) 
0.166   
(0.383) 
0.044   
(0.082) 
0.070** 
(0.033) 
prsa -0.047   (0.038) 
0.061*** 
(0.006) 
-0.463   
(0.669) 
-0.200   
(0.711) 
-0.015   
(0.033) 
-0.113** 
(0.058) 
u 0.002   (0.037) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.231   
(0.432) 
1.750* 
(0.974) 
0.096*** 
(0.034) 
0.073** 
(0.031) 
active 0.052   (0.720) 
0.597*** 
(0.036) 
5.890*** 
(2.366) 
18.941*** 
(6.610) 
2.250*** 
(0.530) 
2.994*** 
(0.556) 
aus 1.288* (0.791) 
0.380*** 
(0.079) 
    
bel -1.122*** (0.310) 
-0.565*** 
(0.067) 
    
fin 2.257* (1.285) 
0.297** 
(0.151) 
    
fra 0.447   (0.920) 
0.411*** 
(0.147) 
    
ger 1.084   (1.083) 
0.899*** 
(0.216) 
    
ire 1.013   (0.809) 
-0.344*** 
(0.083) 
    
ned -0.786** (0.337) 
-0.265*** 
(0.054)     
swe 1.369   (0.892) 
0.226** 
(0.097)     
uk 0.104   (0.635) 
0.199   
(0.140)     
gre   16.754   (10.728) 
42.553** 
(21.228)   
por   22.879*** (8.312) 
62.208* 
(33.375)   
hun     -0.213   (0.291) 
-0.191   
(0.193) 
pol     -2.624*** (0.424) 
-2.780*** 
(0.377) 
constant -38.166*** (12.091) 
-13.013*** 
(1.272) 
-361.909   
(345.253) 
-71.349   
(159.294) 
-53.932*** 
(19.381) 
-54.291*** 
(5.887) 
No. obs. 99 100 30 30 28 28 
R2 0.9257   0.7255 0.998 0.9986 
Wald Chi2  15023.41*** 33366.27*** 415.86*** 134.99*** 5735.14*** 8216.2*** 
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North South East Textiles & 
clothing Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 0.371** (0.190) 
0.291   
(0.193) 
-0.344   
(0.879) 
0.984   
(0.886) 
0.370* 
(0.220) 
0.683*** 
(0.193) 
ma 6.190*** (1.839) 
3.930*** 
(0.988) 
0.097   
(0.209) 
0.850** 
(0.440) 
1.750   
(1.452) 
6.637*** 
(1.450) 
sa -3.853*** (1.378) 
-1.680*** 
(0.599) 
2.703   
(2.163) 
-4.562** 
(2.330) 
2.141   
(1.963) 
-1.744   
(1.085) 
hk -0.001   (0.085) 
0.010   
(0.088) 
0.375*** 
(0.086) 
0.049   
(0.164) 
0.032   
(0.692) 
-0.429   
(0.434) 
hkma 0.423   (0.294) 
0.123   
(0.105) 
-0.938** 
(0.397) 
0.790   
(0.489) 
0.648   
(0.992) 
6.112*** 
(2.402) 
hksa -0.541   (0.347) 
-0.171   
(0.130) 
-0.017   
(0.148) 
-0.168   
(0.271) 
-3.578* 
(1.938) 
-10.304*** 
(2.751) 
pr 0.068** (0.029) 
0.057** 
(0.028) 
0.008   
(0.042) 
0.105** 
(0.045) 
0.154** 
(0.067) 
0.254*** 
(0.038) 
prma -0.159*** (0.037) 
-0.161*** 
(0.031) 
0.002   
(0.010) 
0.027   
(0.033) 
0.121   
(0.082) 
0.350*** 
(0.071) 
prsa -0.017   (0.048) 
-0.005   
(0.013) 
-0.100   
(0.067) 
0.150* 
(0.081) 
-0.188   
(0.124) 
-0.276*** 
(0.062) 
u -0.009   (0.026) 
-0.012   
(0.028) 
-0.189*** 
(0.061) 
-0.124* 
(0.066) 
0.208*** 
(0.073) 
0.242*** 
(0.049) 
active -0.201   (0.178) 
-0.209   
(0.206) 
-0.444   
(0.370) 
0.320   
(0.445) 
2.600*** 
(0.913) 
2.468*** 
(0.666) 
aus 1.486** (0.632) 
1.300*** 
(0.511) 
    
bel -1.524*** (0.208) 
-1.646*** 
(0.183) 
    
fin 2.911*** (1.004) 
2.804*** 
(0.870) 
    
fra 0.307   (0.747) 
0.085   
(0.640) 
    
ger 1.066   (0.933) 
1.088   
(0.866) 
    
ire 1.411** (0.613) 
1.159** 
(0.498) 
    
ned -1.065*** (0.163) 
-1.123*** 
(0.179)     
swe 1.783*** (0.710) 
1.866*** 
(0.665)     
uk -0.113   (0.540) 
-0.202   
(0.486)     
gre   -0.430   (1.030) 
-0.299   
(1.194)   
por   -0.955   (1.152) 
-1.060   
(1.230)   
hun     0.676   (0.777) 
-0.067   
(0.280) 
pol     -1.077   (0.909) 
-1.683*** 
(0.297) 
constant -58.072*** (12.152) 
-53.203*** 
(9.591) 
-51.055** 
(26.421) 
73.759** 
(37.345) 
-81.941** 
(35.009) 
-88.401*** 
(11.428) 
No. obs. 100 100 30 30 30 30 
R2 0.9969 0.9943  0.9897 0.9624 0.9939 
Wald Chi2  10175.4*** 6000.12*** 2630.49*** 1291.33*** 845.47*** 4364.49*** 
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North South East Transport 
equipment Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 1.300*** (0.171) 
1.222*** 
(0.322) 
-5.642*** 
(1.429) 
-7.507*** 
(1.391) 
0.944** 
(0.422) 
-0.341*** 
(0.105) 
ma -3.520*** (0.833) 
2.201** 
(0.945) 
7.970*** 
(1.519) 
13.003*** 
(2.867) 
-0.757** 
(0.384) 
-0.824*** 
(0.340) 
sa 4.326*** (0.895) 
-1.220* 
(0.740) 
0.243   
(0.224) 
-5.422** 
(2.302) 
1.434*** 
(0.437) 
3.305*** 
(0.532) 
hk -0.040   (0.045) 
0.009   
(0.092) 
0.581*** 
(0.153) 
0.546*** 
(0.175) 
0.634*** 
(0.196) 
0.683*** 
(0.198) 
hkma -0.179   (0.198) 
0.211* 
(0.129) 
0.180   
(0.344) 
-1.622   
(4.198) 
0.053   
(0.543) 
-1.332** 
(0.557) 
hksa 0.302** (0.140) 
-0.224   
(0.199) 
-1.056** 
(0.452) 
1.898   
(4.448) 
-1.620*** 
(0.198) 
-1.034** 
(0.431) 
pr -0.148*** (0.014) 
-0.146*** 
(0.025) 
-0.016   
(0.018) 
-0.015   
(0.019) 
0.185*** 
(0.019) 
0.089*** 
(0.028) 
prma -0.040   (0.344) 
-0.671   
(0.601) 
0.034   
(0.037) 
0.315   
(0.304) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.219*** 
(0.026) 
prsa -0.001   (0.358) 
0.665   
(0.625) 
-0.033** 
(0.014) 
-0.289   
(0.296) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.328*** 
(0.043) 
u 0.041*** (0.016) 
0.036   
(0.036) 
-0.376*** 
(0.098) 
-0.426*** 
(0.101) 
0.043   
(0.039) 
0.113*** 
(0.042) 
active -0.841*** (0.168) 
-0.698*** 
(0.269) 
0.699   
(0.522) 
0.333   
(0.490) 
5.593*** 
(0.453) 
5.901*** 
(0.416) 
aus       
bel       
fin 1.795*** (0.364) 
1.754** 
(0.737) 
    
fra -2.230*** (0.508) 
-2.464*** 
(0.925) 
    
ger -2.063*** (0.647) 
-2.177* 
(1.217) 
    
ire       
ned -1.910*** (0.111) 
-1.973*** 
(0.208)     
swe 0.379   (0.325) 
0.376   
(0.648)     
uk -1.855*** (0.390) 
-2.017*** 
(0.726)     
gre   -8.577*** (2.121) 
-12.412*** 
(2.076)   
por   -16.620*** (3.552) 
-22.810*** 
(3.823)   
hun     1.632*** (0.365) 
0.866*** 
(0.180) 
pol     -2.548*** (0.338) 
-1.456*** 
(0.212) 
constant -43.794*** (3.763) 
-44.837*** 
(7.234) 
-10.392   
(13.326) 
47.998*** 
(15.007) 
-57.205*** 
(13.522) 
-66.686*** 
(8.177) 
No. obs. 70 70 30 30 24 28 
R2  0.9978 0.9807  0.9988 0.9977 
Wald Chi2  12389.65*** 19261.15*** 2000.34*** 1898.42*** 37166.7*** 15380.19*** 
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North South East Wood 
products Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
gdp 1.200*** (0.249) 
1.259*** 
(0.262) 
-3.523** 
(1.679) 
-2.293*** 
(0.621) 
1.190*** 
(0.234) 
1.007*** 
(0.220) 
ma 0.237   (0.481) 
0.306   
(0.708) 
0.336   
(1.026) 
-5.623*** 
(2.010) 
-0.419* 
(0.256) 
-0.442* 
(0.239) 
sa -0.449   (0.509) 
-0.338   
(0.884) 
3.571*** 
(1.008) 
9.241*** 
(2.133) 
5.622*** 
(1.134) 
5.642*** 
(1.050) 
hk -0.169* (0.093) 
-0.176** 
(0.089) 
0.409*** 
(0.137) 
-0.014   
(0.112) 
-0.190   
(0.211) 
-0.001   
(0.196) 
hkma -0.491*** (0.175) 
-0.420*** 
(0.171) 
-0.225   
(0.166) 
-0.722   
(0.664) 
-2.162*** 
(0.511) 
-2.042*** 
(0.477) 
hksa 0.605*** (0.177) 
0.309*** 
(0.120) 
0.097   
(0.155) 
1.184   
(0.864) 
-0.385   
(0.348) 
-0.384   
(0.371) 
pr -0.013* (0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.065   
(0.049) 
-0.051   
(0.039) 
0.118*** 
(0.016) 
0.114*** 
(0.015) 
prma 0.020   (0.015) 
0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.064*** 
(0.024) 
-0.166*** 
(0.049) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
prsa 0.009   (0.009) 
0.010   
(0.015) 
0.004   
(0.012) 
0.141*** 
(0.053) 
-0.220*** 
(0.038) 
-0.229*** 
(0.037) 
u 0.080*** (0.024) 
0.083*** 
(0.026) 
-0.212** 
(0.109) 
-0.240*** 
(0.054) 
0.291*** 
(0.042) 
0.282*** 
(0.037) 
active 0.119   (0.183) 
0.074   
(0.192) 
0.329   
(0.605) 
-0.297   
(0.266) 
4.685*** 
(0.596) 
4.516*** 
(0.612) 
aus -1.107*** (0.220) 
-1.001*** 
(0.403) 
    
bel -1.050*** (0.135) 
-1.137*** 
(0.180) 
    
fin -0.359   (0.381) 
-0.388   
(0.718) 
    
fra -3.002*** (0.596) 
-3.219*** 
(0.705) 
    
ger -3.252*** (0.732) 
-3.389*** 
(0.911) 
    
ire 0.211   (0.318) 
0.146   
(0.456) 
    
ned -1.338*** (0.200) 
-1.432*** 
(0.217)     
swe -0.923*** (0.310) 
-0.937* 
(0.571)     
uk -2.257*** (0.491) 
-2.473*** 
(0.555)     
gre   -6.667** (2.779) 
-2.712*** 
(0.892)   
por   -12.127*** (4.209) 
-6.716*** 
(1.227)   
hun     3.017*** (0.462) 
3.052*** 
(0.461) 
pol     -1.224** (0.556) 
-0.810   
(0.545) 
constant -22.833*** (4.514) 
-26.022*** 
(5.667) 
14.282   
(11.985) 
21.680   
(15.325) 
-150.509*** 
(22.591) 
-143.755*** 
(19.272) 
No. obs. 97 97 30 30 25 25 
R2 0.9961 0.9959 0.9972    
Wald Chi2  45453.48*** 68577.11*** 13834.07*** 10985.07*** 23284.71*** 23074.46*** 
 
                                                     
i The default regression method is the Prais-Winsten Correlated Panels Corrected Standard Errors with panel-specific AR(1). Standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The omitted countries in each group are 
those with higher real wages: Denmark in the North, Spain in the South and Czech Republic in the East. Whenever the R2 is not reported, 
the FGLS with panel-specific AR(1) and panel correlation was used instead as the Prais-Winsten was not accepted by STATA. The 
coefficients obtained through the two methods are exactly the same, though the FGLS estimator is more efficient. In the FGLS the R2 is 
not reported as when the GLS parameters are estimated the total sum of squares cannot be broken down as in an OLS regression, 
making the R2 less useful as a diagnostic tool for GLS regressions. Specifically, an R2 computed from GLS sums of squares need not be 
bounded between zero and one and does not represent the percentage of total variation in the dependent variable that is accounted for by 
the model. Additionally, eliminating or adding variables in a model does not always increase or decrease the computed R2 value. 
